Communicating Private Information to the Equity Market before a Dividend Cut: An Empirical Analysis

Communicating Private Information to the Equity Market before a Dividend Cut: An Empirical Analysis

Thomas J. Chemmanur Boston College – Carroll School of Management

Xuan Tian Indiana University – Kelley School of Business

February 2013
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming 

Abstract: 
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the choice of firms regarding whether or not to release private information (“prepare the market”) in advance of a possible dividend cut, and the consequences of such market preparation. We use a hand-collected data set of dividend cutting firms that allows us to distinguish between prepared and non-prepared dividend cutters and test the implications of two alternative theories: the “signaling through market preparation” theory and the “stock return volatility reduction” theory. We document several important differences between prepared and non-prepared dividend cutters. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the signaling theory.

On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listings

On the Fortunes of Stock Exchanges and Their Reversals: Evidence from Foreign Listings

Nuno Goncalves Gracias Fernandes IMD International

Mariassunta Giannetti Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

March 16, 2013
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming 

Abstract: 
Using a sample that provides unprecedented detail on foreign listings for 29 exchanges in 24 countries starting from the early 1980s, we show that although firms list in countries with better investor protection, they are less likely to list in countries with excessively stronger investor protection. We provide evidence based on ex ante firm and market characteristics and ex post listing outcomes that our findings are due to lack of investor interest in firms from environments with much weaker investor protection. We also argue that our findings, together with a general trend of improvement in investor protection in many firms’ countries of origin, can explain why U.S. and U.K. exchanges have attracted an increasing number of foreign listings during our sample period.

The Supercharged IPO; A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last two decades, allowing owner-founders to extract billions of dollars from newly-public companies

The Supercharged IPO

Victor Fleischer University of Colorado Law School; University of San Diego

Nancy C. Staudt USC Gould School of Law

March 26, 2013
Vanderbilt Law Review, 2014
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C13-6
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 13-6 

Abstract: 
A new innovation on the IPO landscape has emerged in the last two decades, allowing owner-founders to extract billions of dollars from newly-public companies. These IPOs — labeled supercharged IPOs — have been the subject of widespread debate and controversy: lawyers, financial experts, journalists, and Members of Congress have all weighed in on the topic. Some have argued that supercharged IPOs are a “brilliant, just brilliant,” while others have argued they are “underhanded” and “bizarre.”

In this article, we explore the supercharged IPO and explain how and why this new deal structure differs from the more traditional IPO. We then outline various theories of financial innovation and note that the extant literature provides useful explanations for why supercharged IPOs emerged and spread so quickly across industries and geographic areas. The literature also provides support for both legitimate and opportunistic uses of the supercharged IPO. With the help of a large-N quantitative study — the first of its kind — we investigate the adoption and diffusion of this new innovation. We find that the reason parties have begun to supercharge their IPO is not linked to a desire to steal from naïve investors, but rather for tax planning purposes. Supercharged IPOs enable both owner-founders and public investors to save substantial amounts of money in federal and state taxes. With respect to the spread of the innovation, we find that elite lawyers, especially those located in New York City, are largely responsible for the changes that we observe on the IPO landscape. We conclude our study by demonstrating how our empirical findings can be used to 1) advance the literature on innovation, 2) assist firms going public in the future, and 3) shape legal reform down the road.

The Psychology of Tail Events: Progress and Challenges

The Psychology of Tail Events: Progress and Challenges

Nicholas Barberis Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

March 11, 2013

Abstract: 
Over the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in “tail events” – rare, high-impact events. In this article, I start by summarizing some recent progress in our understanding of the psychology of tail events. I suggest that much of this progress has centered on the concept of “probability weighting” and, in particular, on applications of this concept in various fields of economics. I then describe some major open questions in this area.

Adapt or Perish: Evidence of CEO Adaptability to Strategic Industry Shocks

Adapt or Perish: Evidence of CEO Adaptability to Strategic Industry Shocks

Wayne R. Guay University of Pennsylvania – Accounting Department

Daniel J. Taylor University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School

Jason J. Xiao University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School

March 13, 2013

Abstract: 
Prior turnover literature documents various signals of poor performance that lead a board of directors to terminate the CEO, but does not explore the underlying causes of the CEO’s poor performance. Recognizing that terminated CEOs have often been successful earlier in their tenure, we conjecture that strategic shocks to a firm’s business environment can cause the board to decide that the existing CEO’s skills do not fit with the firm’s current leadership needs. Moreover, prior research on manager ability engenders the question of whether managers are specialists or are instead capable of adapting their “style” to the changing economic conditions. We examine industry-level changes in investing, financing, and operating policies, and their effects on CEO turnover. Our turnover results suggest that CEOs struggle to adapt to a change in industry globalization, investment and marketing efforts. We also find that boards consider the CEO’s performance in response to strategic industry shocks when inferring the CEO’s adaptability, and that the sensitivity of turnover to these shocks varies with activist investors, CEO tenure, and CEO entrenchment.

Do Countries Falsify Economic Data Strategically? Some Evidence that They Do

Do Countries Falsify Economic Data Strategically? Some Evidence that They Do

Tomasz Kamil Michalski HEC Paris – Department of Economics and Decision Sciences

Gilles Stoltz Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan; HEC Paris – Department of Economics and Decision Sciences

The Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming
HEC Paris Research Paper No. 930/2010 

Abstract: 
We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner. Among those suspected are countries with
fixed exchange rate regimes, high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances, which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model. We also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America release economic data of questionable veracity. Our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data.

Risk Management: History, Definition and Critique

Risk Management: History, Definition and Critique

Georges Dionne HEC Montreal – Department of Finance

March 11, 2013

Abstract: 
La version française de ce document est disponible à http://ssrn.com/abstract=2198583
The study of risk management began after World War II. Risk management has long been associated with the use of market insurance to protect individuals and companies from various losses associated with accidents. Other forms of risk management, alternatives to market insurance, surfaced during the 1950s when market insurance was perceived as very costly and incomplete for protection against pure risk. The use of derivatives as risk management instruments arose during the 1970s, and expanded rapidly during the 1980s, as companies intensified their financial risk management. International risk regulation began in the 1990s, and financial firms developed internal risk management models and capital calculation formulas to hedge against unanticipated risks and reduce regulatory capital. Concomitantly, governance of risk management became essential, integrated risk management was introduced and the first corporate risk officer positions were created. Nonetheless, these regulations, governance rules and risk management methods failed to prevent the financial crisis that began in 2007.

In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms

In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms

Mariana Pargendler Fundação Getulio Vargas School of Law at São Paulo

Aldo Musacchio Harvard Business School – Business, Government and the International Economy Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research

Sergio G. Lazzarini Insper Institute of Education and Research

February 14, 2013
Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Working Paper No. 13-071 

Abstract: 
A large legal and economic literature describes how state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffer from a variety of agency and political problems. Less theory and evidence, however, have been generated about the reasons why state-owned enterprises listed in stock markets manage to attract investors to buy their shares (and bonds). In this Article, we examine this apparent puzzle and develop a theory of how legal and extralegal constraints allow mixed enterprises to solve some of these problems. We then use three detailed case studies of state-owned oil companies – Brazil’s Petrobras, Norway’s Statoil, and Mexico’s Pemex – to examine how our theory fares in practice. Overall, we show how mixed enterprises have made progress to solve some of their agency problems, even as government intervention persists as the biggest threat to private minority shareholders in these firms.

Hole in the Wall: A Study of Short Selling and Private Placements

Hole in the Wall: A Study of Short Selling and Private Placements

Henk Berkman University of Auckland – Faculty of Business & Economics

Michael D. McKenzie University of Sydney – Discipline of Finance; University of Cambridge – Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (CERF); Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Patrick Verwijmeren Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) – Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

March 23, 2013

Abstract: 
Companies planning a private placement typically gauge the interest of institutional buyers before the offering is publicly announced. Regulators are concerned with this practice, called wall-crossing, as it might invite insider trading, especially when the potential investors are hedge funds. We examine privately placed common stock and convertible offerings and find widespread evidence of pre-announcement short selling. We show that pre-announcement short sellers are able to predict announcement day returns. The effects are especially strong when hedge funds are involved and when the number of buyers is high.

‘Hidden Recommendations’: A Re-Classification of Stock Recommendations

‘Hidden Recommendations’: A Re-Classification of Stock Recommendations

Ronald Espinosa University of California, Berkeley – Accounting Group

December 14, 2012

Abstract: 
Using a large database of analysts’ target prices and recommendations issued over the period 1999-2011, this paper documents the presence of inconsistencies between recommendation and implied return in the sell-side analysts’ target prices, and analyzes its impact on market prices. In particular, it analyzes if these inconsistencies are identified by investors at the announcement and if they are related to incentives to manipulate the recommendations. The paper finds that investors are capable to identify these inconsistent signals among the rest of recommendations. This study also shows that the inconsistencies between recommendation and implied return would be explained by analysts’ incentives to bias the stock recommendation upward (downward), against the direction suggested by the implied return, when the stock presents higher (lower) recent past performance, higher (lower) “glamour” characteristics and higher (lower) brokerage fee potential.

Valuation-Driven Profit Transfer Among Corporate Segments; the desire to achieve higher equity valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings; simple sum-of-the-parts valuation with multiples tends to overestimate the enterprise values for conglomerates

Valuation-Driven Profit Transfer Among Corporate Segments

Haifeng You Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) – Department of Accounting

March 11, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper investigates whether the desire to achieve higher equity valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings. I extend the Stein (1989) model to a multi-segment setting and show that conglomerates have incentives to transfer profits from segments operating in industries with lower valuation multiples to those with higher multiples, even if the market is not fooled in equilibrium. If companies engage in such manipulation, segments with relatively high (low) valuations should report abnormally high (low) profits. The empirical tests confirm this prediction and further show that the relation is stronger for firms with more dispersed segment valuations. Finally, this paper also demonstrates that the simple sum-of-the-parts valuation with multiples tends to overestimate the enterprise values for conglomerates, and the measurement errors increase with segment valuation dispersions.

Selling-Price Estimates in Revenue Recognition and Earnings Informativeness

Selling-Price Estimates in Revenue Recognition and Earnings Informativeness

Anup Srivastava Northwestern University – Kellogg School of Management

March 15, 2013
Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming 

Abstract: 
Revenue is one of the largest and most value-relevant items in firms’ financial statements. Based on the “realizable” and the “earned” criteria of SFAC No. 5 (FASB 1984), revenues should reflect both selling price and timing of delivery. Of those two aspects, selling-price estimates are required for revenue recognition when standalone selling prices for products and services are not available. In this study, I examine the effects of such selling-price estimates on the contracting and informational roles of financial statements. Particularly, I examine the setting of SOP 97-2 (AICPA 1997), which removed software firms’ flexibility to recognize revenues using selling-price estimates. I find that the extent to which firms use revenue accruals to manage earnings declined after SOP 97-2 was implemented. Yet, the overall frequency of earnings management did not decline, indicating that firms shift to alternative modes of earnings management when constrained from using revenue estimates to manage earnings. In addition, I find that the value relevant information contained in earnings declined post-SOP 97-2 implementation. Yet, this information was not entirely lost from financial statements, because the deferred-revenue accounts now contain more value-relevant information than before, and a firm’s topline performance is now better ascertained by analyzing both revenue and deferred-revenue accounts. This study shows that SOP 97-2 implementation did not improve the contracting role of earnings; however, its implementation partly shifted the informational role of financial statements from income-statement to balance-sheet components.

The Effect of CEO and CFO Resignations on Going Concern Opinions

The Effect of CEO and CFO Resignations on Going Concern Opinions

Joseph Beams University of New Orleans

Yun-Chia Yan University of New Orleans – Department of Accounting

February 5, 2013

Abstract: 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the resignation of a top executive increases a firm’s likelihood of failure. When auditors perceive an increased likelihood of failure, a going concern modified audit opinion is issued. This study tests the relationship between top management resignations and the issuance of going concern audit opinions. Firms in which a CEO or CFO resigned were more likely to receive a going concern audit opinion than firms in which the CEO or CFO did not resign. The study uses financially distressed firms from 2008-2010 and a logistic regression model to test the relationship. The findings show a positive relationship between CFO resignations and firms receiving a going concern audit opinion. However, no significant relationship is found between CEO resignations and receiving a going concern audit opinion. Firm size, cash flow from operations, stock return, and investments also had a significant relationship with going concern opinions.

How Fair are the Valuations of Private Equity Funds? Investors should be extremely wary of basing investment decisions on the returns – especially IRRs – of the current fund.

How Fair are the Valuations of Private Equity Funds?

Tim Jenkinson University of Oxford – Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Miguel Sousa University of Oxford – Said Business School; School of Economics and Management, University of Porto

Rüdiger Stucke University of Oxford – Said Business School

February 27, 2013

Abstract: 
The ultimate performance of private equity funds is only known once all investments have been sold, and the cash returned to investors. This typically takes over a decade. In the meantime, the reported performance depends on the valuation of the remaining portfolio companies. Private equity houses market their next fund on the basis of these interim valuations of their current fund. In this paper we analyze whether these valuations are fair, whether the extent of conservative or aggressive valuations differ during the life of the fund, and at what stage interim performance measures predict ultimate performance. This paper is the first to use the quarterly valuations and cash flows for the entire history of 761 fund investments made by Calpers – the largest U.S. investor in private equity. Our main findings are as follows. First, over the entire life of the fund we find evidence that fund valuations are conservative, and tend to be smoothed (relative to movements in public markets): valuations understate subsequent distributions by around 35% on average. We find a significant jump in valuations in the fourth-quarter, when funds are normally audited. Second, the exception to this general conservatism is the period when follow-on funds are being raised. We find that valuations, and reported returns, are inflated during fundraising, with a gradual reversal once the follow-on fund has been closed. Third, we find that the performance figures reported by funds during fund-raising have little power to predict ultimate returns. This is especially true when performance is measured by IRR. Using public market equivalent measures increases predictability significantly. Our results show that investors should be extremely wary of basing investment decisions on the returns – especially IRRs – of the current fund.

Information Flows in Dark Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades

Information Flows in Dark Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades

Lukas Menkhoff Leibniz Universitaet Hannover – Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Lucio Sarno City University London – Sir John Cass Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Maik Schmeling City University London – Sir John Cass Business School

Andreas Schrimpf Bank for International Settlements (BIS) – Monetary and Economic Department

March 5, 2013

Abstract: 
We study the information in order flows of different customer segments in the world’s largest over-the-counter market, the foreign exchange market. The analysis draws on a unique dataset covering a broad cross-section of currency pairs and distinguishing trades by key types of foreign exchange end-users. We find that order flows are highly informative about future exchange rates and provide significant economic value for the few large dealers who have access to these flows. Moreover, customer groups systematically engage in risk sharing with each other and differ markedly in their predictive ability, trading styles, and risk exposure.

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Baruch Lev  New York University – Stern School of Business

Benjamin N Lansford affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jennifer Wu Tucker affiliation not provided to SSRN

January/February 2013
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 40, Issue 1-2, pp. 26-54, 2013 

Abstract: 
Whether managers should provide earnings guidance, especially quarterly guidance, has been a hotly debated policy issue. Influential organizations have urged firms to stop providing earnings guidance to reduce earnings fixation and short‐termism in the capital markets. Little attention has been paid to an alternative proposal: instead of ceasing earnings guidance, companies could provide disaggregated earnings guidance. No archival evidence exists regarding the determinants of disaggregated earnings guidance and its effects on the firm and its information environment. We find that once managers provide guidance, the decision to disaggregate this guidance is primarily driven by demand‐and‐supply factors that exhibit little change from year to year rather than by strategic factors. We find more timely analyst forecast revisions (with no compromise of forecast accuracy), a greater magnitude of revisions, and a larger reduction in analyst disagreement for disaggregating firms than for non‐disaggregating firms. These findings suggest that disaggregation enriches a firm’s information environment. We also find that disaggregation helps managers align analyst expectations with their own, but firms are punished by investors for providing multiple performance targets but missing them.

Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risk

Real and Accrual Earnings Management and IPO Failure Risk

Mohammad Alhadab University of Leeds – Leeds University Business School (LUBS)

Iain Clacher University of Leeds – Leeds University Business School (LUBS)

Kevin Keasey University of Leeds – Division of Accounting and Finance

February 26, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the relationship between real and accrual earnings management activities and IPO failure risk. Recent research shows that IPO firms manage earnings upward around the offer year utilizing real and accrual earnings management activities (e.g., Wongsunwai, 2012) and that these activities have severe negative consequences for future stock returns and operating performance (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). Thus, we predict IPO firms that engaged in higher levels of real and accrual earnings management will exhibit a higher probability of failure and lower survival rates. We test this hypothesis based on a sample of 570 IPO firms that went public over the period 1998-2008. We find evidence that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward utilizing real and accrual earnings management around the IPO. We also find that IPO firms with higher levels of real and accrual earnings management during the IPO year have a higher probability of IPO failure and lower survival rates in subsequent periods.

What Should Business Schools Teach Managers?

What Should Business Schools Teach Managers?

Martin Parker University of Leicester

Gordon Pearson Keele University

Spring 2013
Business and Society Review, Vol. 118, Issue 1, pp. 1-22, 2013 

Abstract: 
This article is the fourth dialogue in a series in which two characters, a pro‐business experienced manager and a critical management academic idealist, debate contemporary management. In this dialogue, the discussion concerns the curriculum of business and management courses. Though as usual there is little agreement between the two participants, the discussion clearly shows just how difficult it will be to change business education without also changing the market position of business schools. Other topics concern the sort of economic assumptions embedded in much of the curriculum, and the relationship between practical skills and political descriptions of capitalism.

Disappearing Subsidiaries: The Cases of Google and Oracle

Disappearing Subsidiaries: The Cases of Google and Oracle

Jeffrey D. Gramlich University of Southern Maine – School of Business

Janie Whiteaker-Poe University of Kansas

March 6, 2013

Abstract: 
From 2009 to 2010, 98 percent of Google’s and 99 percent of Oracle’s subsidiaries disappeared from the Exhibit 21s filed with their SEC Form 10Ks. However, a March 2012 search of available public company registries revealed that at least 65 percent of the missing subsidiaries remained active as of the companies’ 2010 filing dates. The decisions of Google and Oracle to disclose fewer subsidiaries stands in contrast to the literature documenting that firms providing more information enjoy lower costs of debt and equity capital. We employ legitimacy theory, institutional theory, agency theory, and political cost theory to explain the Google and Oracle decisions. Ultimately, however, we develop a new insight, that tax avoidance represents an additional source of capital beyond debt and equity, and this capital source exists in a unique setting that encourages less disclosure of certain types of information.

The Real Exit: Selling Strategies Subsequent to Private Equity Backed IPOs

The Real Exit: Selling Strategies Subsequent to Private Equity Backed IPOs

Nikolai Visnjic Goethe University Frankfurt

March 4, 2013

Abstract: 
This study examines the exit strategy of private equity investors after they take their portfolio companies public. Recent empirical studies considering private equity exit channel and timing generally fail to expose the investor’s strategy after the IPO. For this purpose I use a comprehensive set of PE backed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 in the United States and subsequently track governance characteristics until investors exit their controlling stakes. I find strong evidence that PE investors strategically choose whether to sell their position en bloc in a trade sale or gradually to dispersed shareholders on the secondary market. Severe governance differences between the two groups of exit strategies at IPO and evolving from IPO to exit suggest that PE investors anticipate and actively plan an eventual trade sale well in advance.

Chinese Guanxi/ Social Networking: An Integrative Review and New Directions for Future Research 中国人的关系: 综合文献回顾及未来研究方向

Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and New Directions for Future Research 中国人的关系: 综合文献回顾及未来研究方向

Chao C. Chen the State University of New Jersey

Xiao‐Ping Chen University of Washington

Shengsheng Huang University of Houston‐Victoria

March 2013
Management and Organization Review, Vol. 9, Issue 1, pp. 167-207, 2013 

Abstract: 
In this article we review research on Chinese guanxi and social networking in the past twenty years and identify the major perspectives, theories, and methodologies used in guanxi research at micro and macro levels. We summarize the main findings of over 200 journal articles on guanxi research in terms of its conceptual definitions and measurements, its antecedents and consequences, and its dynamics and processes. Furthermore, we identify the gaps between different levels of guanxi research and discuss future directions to advance our understanding of the complex and intricate guanxi phenomenon. 摘要. 本文综合回顾了过去二十年来中外文献中有关中国人关系和社会网络的研究,对微观及宏观层次上关系研究的主要视角、理论、及研究方法进行了区分,并对关系研究在概念定义、测量、前因后果、动态变化和过程等方面的主要实证研究结果进行了总结。此外,本文论述了不同层次关系研究之间的空白并指出了未来研究方向, 以便更深入全面地探讨和了解关系现象的错综复杂性。

Do Short Sellers Front-Run Insider Sales?

Do Short Sellers Front-Run Insider Sales?

Mozaffar Khan University of Minnesota – Twin Cities – Carlson School of Management

Hai Lu University of Toronto – Rotman School of Management

February 28, 2013
Accounting Review, 2013 

Abstract: 
We study the behavior of short sellers as informed market participants and examine potential sources of their information. Using a newly available dataset with high-frequency short sales data, we find evidence of significant increases in short sales immediately prior to large insider sales, but not prior to small insider sales. We examine a number of explanations that the increase in short sales is driven by public information, either about the firm or about the impending insider sale. The evidence is inconsistent with these explanations, but is consistent with front-running facilitated by leaked information. The front-running appears to be concentrated in firms with poor accounting quality, suggesting that information about a large insider sale reinforces short sellers’ adverse opinion about firm value when accounting quality is poor.

Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide

Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide

Tanja Artiga Gonzalez University of St. Gallen

Markus M. Schmid University of St. Gallen – Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance

David Yermack NYU Stern School of Business

March 6, 2013

Abstract: 
We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 216 U.S. companies accused of price fixing by antitrust authorities. We document a range of strategies used by these firms when reporting financial results, including frequent earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors who are likely to be inattentive monitors due to their status as foreign or “busy.” When directors resign, they are often not replaced, and new auditors are rarely engaged. Cartel managers exercise their stock options faster than managers of other firms. While our results are based only upon firms engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor performance or personal wrongdoing.

The Dark Side of ETF Investing: A World-Wide Analysis

Si Cheng National University of Singapore (NUS) – Department of Finance
Massimo Massa INSEAD – Finance
Hong Zhang INSEAD – Finance
March 8, 2013
INSEAD Working Paper No. 2013/39/FIN
Abstract: 
We study conflicts of interest in the exchange-traded fund (ETF) industry around the world. We provide evidence that ETFs provide cheap funding resources to benefit the other members of the financial groups to which they belong. We identify three channels via which this happens. First, the ETF’s assets are used by the affiliated bank to leverage its (lending-related) information. Second, ETFs subsidize affiliated banks when the latter are in need, i.e., unprofitable or poorly rated. Third, the ETFs help affiliated OEFs through cross-trading, that is, they load up on unnecessary (to track the benchmark) volatility that will expose them in the event that the affiliated bank becomes distressed. The effects prevail in ETFs that do not fully replicate their benchmark holdings and that domiciled in Europe. Market awareness of this risk is reflected in reduced flows and a lower ETF price premium. These results have important normative implications for both consumer protection and financial stability.

Mutual Funds Win and Investors Lose

John A. Haslem

University of Maryland – Robert H. Smith School of Business

February 25, 2013
Journal of Index Investing, Vol.3, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 31-40 

Abstract: 
This study provides in-depth coverage of important findings surrounding the question of why investors continue to buy underperforming actively managed mutual funds. This issue is complicated by the finding that active managers have skill that allows them to add fund value, but that is not shared with investors, who continue to earn negative alphas. So why do investors persist in earning below market returns? Four possible answers are discussed: 1) investor overconfidence; 2) strategic fund repricing decisions; 3) fund “sentiment contrarian behavior;” and 4) investor dependence on brokers with agency conflicted incentives.

Equity Manager Selection and Portfolio Formation: Interviews with Investment Staff

F. Douglas Foster

University of Technology, Sydney

Geoff Warren

Australian National University (ANU) – School of Finance & Applied Statistics; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

January 24, 2013
Abstract:      

We interview professional institutional investors to generate insights into how they choose between active and passive management, select active equity managers and construct multi-manager portfolios. We find that subjective judgment plays a central role in decision-making. Particularly important is the evaluation of people when selecting managers, the role of confidence in retaining managers, and self-perceptions about capability to identify skilled managers. Key evaluations are often made conditionally, notably including the response to past performance where the aim is to understand return sources. Stated reasons for preferring active management relate to whether a handful of skilled active managers can be identified and combined to generate a better expected portfolio outcome; and are only vaguely associated with the performance of the average manager.

Technology forecasting: A new “step and wait” model claims to outperform industry rules of thumb in predictive power; advances in performance are often followed by a waiting period before the next step forward

Predicting the Path of Technological Innovation: SAW Versus Moore, Bass, Gompertz, and Kryder

Ashish Sood, Gareth M. James, Gerard J. Tellis, and Ji Zhu*

Marketing Science

Abstract

Competition is intense among rival technologies and success depends on predicting their future trajectory of performance. To resolve this challenge, managers often follow popular heuristics, generalizations, or “laws” like the Moore’s Law. We propose a model, Step And Wait (SAW), for predicting the path of technological innovation and compare its performance against eight models for 25 technologies and 804 technologies-years across six markets. The estimates of the model provide four important results. First, Moore’s Law and Kryder’s law do not generalize across markets; none holds for all technologies even in a single market. Second, SAW produces superior predictions over traditional methods, such as the Bass model or Gompertz law, and can form predictions for a completely new technology, by incorporating information from other categories on time varying covariates. Third, analysis of the model parameters suggests that: i) recent technologies improve at a faster rate than old technologies; ii) as the number of competitors increases, performance improves in smaller steps and longer waits; iii) later entrants and technologies that have a number of prior steps tend to have smaller steps and shorter waits; but iv) technologies with long average wait time continue to have large steps. Fourth, technologies cluster in their performance by market.

The law and the profits

Technology forecasting: A new “step and wait” model claims to outperform industry rules of thumb in predictive power

Mar 9th 2013 |From the print edition

PREDICTING the course of technological progress can be a risky business. Scorn the latest advances and you risk being left behind, as when Sony kept investing in flat-screen versions of cathode-ray televisions in the 1990s while Samsung piled into liquid-crystal displays (LCDs), and eventually replaced Sony as market leader. Embrace new ideas too early, though, and you may be left with egg on your face, as when General Motors spent more than $1 billion developing hydrogen fuel cells a decade ago, only to see them overtaken by lithium-ion batteries as the preferred power source for electric and hybrid vehicles.

To determine when to proceed with a new technology many managers and engineers employ popular heuristics, some of which are seen as “laws”. The best known is Moore’s law, proposed in 1965 by Gordon Moore, a co-founder of Intel. At first it stated that as more transistors are crammed onto the surface of silicon chips, the devices double in performance every year. This law was later revised to two years, and chip performance is now usually reckoned to double every 18 months. Other laws use “S” curves and various other calculations to predict how technologies will evolve.

Many of these laws have become widely accepted and are now applied when drawing conclusions about a broad range of technologies. Some have become self-fulfilling. Chipmakers, for example, use Moore’s law to co-ordinate their research and development (R&D) activity and plan their capital investment. In reality, however, such laws are unreliable because progress is rarely smooth. So Ashish Sood of the Goizueta School of Business at Emory University, Atlanta, and his colleagues have come up with their own law, which is explicitly based on the tendency of technology to progress in stops and starts.

Their “step and wait” (SAW) model, recently published in Marketing Science, notes that advances in performance are often followed by a waiting period before the next step forward. The steps can be big or small, and the waiting periods long or short. The researchers also hypothesise that greater support for innovation means new technologies improve in larger and more frequent steps than old technologies did. This is the result of higher R&D spending, the existence of better tools and the fact that more countries are undertaking research. But as the number of competitors in a new field increases, both the size of the steps and the length of the wait for the next step can change. Read more of this post

The Dirty Laundry of Employee Award Programs: Evidence from the Field

The Dirty Laundry of Employee Award Programs: Evidence from the Field

Timothy Gubler Washington University in Saint Louis – John M. Olin Business School

Ian Larkin Harvard Business School – Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Unit

Lamar Pierce Washington University, Saint Louis – John M. Olin School of Business

February 11, 2013
Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 13-069 

Abstract: 
Many scholars and practitioners have recently argued that corporate awards are a “free” way to motivate employees. We use field data from an attendance award program implemented at one of five industrial laundry plants to show that awards can carry significant spillover costs and may be less effective at motivating employees than the literature suggests. Our quasi-experimental setting shows that two types of unintended consequences limit gains from the reward program. First, employees strategically game the program, improving timeliness only when eligible for the award, and call in sick to retain eligibility. Second, employees with perfect pre-program attendance or high productivity suffered a 6-8% productivity decrease after program introduction, suggesting they were demotivated by awards for good behavior they already exhibited. Overall, our results suggest the award program decreased plant productivity by 1.4%, and that positive effects from awards are accompanied by more complex employee responses that limit program effectiveness.

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts in China

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Management Earnings Forecasts in China

Xiaobei Huang University of International Business and Economics – Business School

Xi Li Temple University – Fox School of Business and Management

Senyo Y. Tse Texas A&M University – Lowry Mays College & Graduate School of Business

Jenny Wu Tucker University of Florida – Warrington College of Business Administration

January 14, 2013
Mays Business School Research Paper No. 2012-82 

Abstract: 
Capital-market regulators face the question of whether a forecast mandate would improve the information environment or be counterproductive if managers are unable or unwilling to provide reliable forward-looking information. We examine the efficacy of forecast regulation in the emerging market of China, which mandates management earnings forecasts in certain performance regions such as anticipated losses, turning profits, or large changes in earnings from the previous year and allows voluntary forecasts in other circumstances. We examine the quantity, quality, and usefulness of mandatory forecasts by comparing managerial behavior under the mandatory vs. voluntary regime within China. We gain further insight by examining forecast behavior in the US, where forecasts are voluntary, in performance regions similar to those defined by the Chinese mandate. Our results suggest that the Chinese mandate substantially increases the quantity of information available to investors, particularly by state-owned enterprises (SOE) – firms that play a major role in the economy but are reluctant to provide forecasts voluntarily. After issuing mandatory forecasts, firms are more likely to issue voluntary forecasts in the subsequent year. Mandatory forecasts are less timely and less precise than voluntary forecasts, but the evidence on forecast accuracy is inconclusive. Investors react to mandatory forecasts as if they are useful. One unintended consequence of the Chinese mandate is that firms appear to manage their reported earnings to avoid the bright-line threshold for mandatory forecasts of large earnings decreases. Overall, our evidence provides feedback to regulators in developed economies and guidance to regulators in emerging markets.

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Elias Bengtsson Sveriges Riksbank

February 1, 2013
CITYPERC Working Paper Series No. 2013/06 

Abstract: 
Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so-called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non-bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.