Who Trades Against Mispricing?
May 21, 2014 Leave a comment
Who Trades Against Mispricing?
Mariassunta Giannetti
Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance
Bige Kahraman
Stockholm School of Economics – Department of Finance; Swedish House of Finance
April 1, 2014
Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 14-09
Abstract:
We investigate whether redemption risk hinders managerial incentives to trade against mispricing (as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). We begin our analysis by comparing the trading behavior of closed-end funds – which are not subject to redemption risk – with that of open-end funds in stocks that are mispriced due to a fire sale or sentiment shocks. We find that closed-end funds purchase (sell) fire sale (purchase) stocks to a larger extent than open-end funds. Moreover, closed-end funds’ portfolios are more exposed to stocks that are likely to be undervalued because of negative sentiment shocks. Differences in trading behavior are more pronounced for stocks with higher arbitrage risk. Finally, we extend our analysis to hedge funds and show that hedge funds with share restrictions behave similarly to closed-end funds. Redemption risk thus appears to be an important impediment to arbitrage.
