Gaming the Float: How Managers Respond to EPS-Based Incentives

Gaming the Float: How Managers Respond to EPS-Based Incentives

Alan D. Crane Rice University – Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

Andrew Koch University of Pittsburgh – Finance Group

Chishen Wei University of Texas at Austin

June 27, 2013

Abstract: 
We show that the likelihood of meeting earnings per share (EPS) forecasts is mechanically positively related to the number of shares outstanding. As a result, managers can affect the long run probability of meeting future EPS forecasts without managing earnings or affecting analysts’ forecasts. We find that firms with unpredictable earnings and firms with managers that have compensation more sensitive to EPS outcomes have more shares outstanding. To address causality, we find that an exogenous drop in the likelihood of meeting a forecast causes managers to increase shares outstanding, primarily through stock splits. Following an increase in shares, accounting and real earnings management drop, and the firm meets EPS forecasts more frequently going forward. Our results also offer a new explanation for stock splits; and provide evidence of a channel that relates EPS incentives to analysts’ forecast errors, stock liquidity, and price levels.

Sentiment, Earnings Co-Movements and Earnings Manipulation

Sentiment, Earnings Co-Movements and Earnings Manipulation

Andrew B. Jackson University of New South Wales (UNSW) – School of Accounting

Brian Rountree Rice University – Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business

June 11, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper provides an empirical validation of the theoretical model in Strobl [2013]. Our results are consistent with the model, which document the greater co-movement of earnings with the market the less likely a firm is to manipulate earnings. Furthermore, we find evidence that the probability of manipulation and the importance of earnings co-movements in determining that probability increase as the state of the economy improves. This means earnings management is more prevalent during expansions relative to recessions. Additionally, we provide evidence that firms which are more sensitive to market sentiment are more likely to have managed earnings with a stronger effect during the best economic times. Overall, our results are helpful in understanding the time varying nature of earnings management.

An Analysis of the Financial Schemes to Defraud People in the Garb of Sound Investment

An Analysis of the Financial Schemes to Defraud People in the Garb of Sound Investment

Sujoy Kumar Dhar Sr. Icfai Business School (IBS)

June 15, 2013

Abstract: 
Different conventional financial schemes are prevalent in the market such as bank deposits, post office schemes. Life Insurance products, Public Provident Fund, Government and Corporate Bond, equity share, mutual fund schemes, real estate, gold, bullion, derivative products, paintings and antiques which offers a certain rate of return depending on the riskiness of the scheme. Apart from these traditional players, , there are Nidhi companies, Chit fund players, Non Banking Financial Companies as well as Financial intermediaries which are alluring the layman retail investors by making a promise of offer a super normal rate of return. Due to the lack of adequate financial literacy and the greed of appropriating above average return, a major section of the retail investors are being trapped by those unscrupulous lenders. As a result, they have to lose their hard earned money and this creates a keen jerking effect to the all stakeholders of the nation. The RBI and SEBI has already conducted different financial awareness program to protect the depositors as well as investors from these ponzi schemes. The objectives of the research paper is to focus on the major threats imposed by the shadow bankers, to analyze the unholy nexus of the media business and chit fund players, to interpret the interdependence between the banks, micro finance institutions, chit fund payers. The methodology of the paper is collecting the secondary data from the different research articles of various national and international reputed journals which are available in Ebscho and Emerald. Simultaneously analysis and collection of secondary data is performed from the Annual Reports of Reserve Bank of India, Security Exchange Board of India, website of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India etc. This paper will give a new dimension in the literature of investment strategies of the Individual Investors

Insight Private Equity on the black box of restructuring tools private equity investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies

Insight Private Equity

Andrej Gill Goethe University Frankfurt – Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Nikolai Visnjic Goethe University Frankfurt

June 18, 2013
SAFE Working Paper No. 23

Abstract: 
We are able to shed light on the black box of restructuring tools private equity investors use to improve the operational performance of their portfolio companies. By building on previous work considering performance evaluation of PE backed companies, we analyze whether private equity improves operating efficiency and which of the typical restructuring tools are the main performance drivers. Using a set of over 300 international leveraged buyout transactions of the last thirty years, we find that while there is vast improvement in operational efficiency, these gains vary considerably. Our top performing transactions are subject to strong equity incentives, frequent asset restructuring and tight control by the investor. Furthermore, investors’ experience has a positive influence while financial leverage has no influence on operational performance.

Unethical Culture, Suspect CEOS, and Corporate Misbehavior

Unethical Culture, Suspect CEOS, and Corporate Misbehavior

Lee Biggerstaff  University of Tennessee, Knoxville – Department of Finance

David C. Cicero University of Alabama – Culverhouse College of Commerce & Business Administration

Andy Puckett University of Tennessee, Knoxville

June 2013

Abstract: 
We show that firms with CEOs who personally benefited from options backdating were more likely to engage in other forms of corporate misbehavior, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms were more likely to overstate firm profitability and to engage in less profitable acquisition strategies. The increased level of corporate misbehavior is concentrated in firms with suspect CEOs who were outside hires, consistent with adverse selection in the market for chief executives. Difference-in-differences tests confirm that the propensity to engage in these activities is significantly increased following the arrival of an outside-hire ‘suspect’ CEO, suggesting that causation flows from the top executives to the firm. Finally, while these suspect CEOs appear to have avoided market discipline when the market was optimistic, they were more likely to lose their jobs, and their firms were more likely to experience dramatic declines in value during the ensuing market correction.

Z-Score Models’ Application to Italian Companies Subject to Extraordinary Administration

Z-Score Models’ Application to Italian Companies Subject to Extraordinary Administration

Edward I. Altman New York University (NYU) – Salomon Center; New York University (NYU) – Department of Finance

Alberto Falini University of Brescia – Department of Economics

Alessandro Danovi University of Bergamo (Italy)

May 1, 2013
Bancaria No. 04-2013

Abstract: 
It is normal for companies, during their life cycle, to alternate between positive and negative phases, periods of success and failure. When a negative period shifts from temporary to structural and chronic (and thus continues over time), the company is often destined to go bankrupt. The uncertainty regarding the exact moment when this takes place has brought about a plethora of quantitative and qualitative models aimed at predicting bankruptcy. This study applies the most well-known of these models, the Z-Score, through an application to Italian companies subject to extraordinary administration between 2000 and 2010. The results confirm a good predictive effectiveness, though Italian peculiarities could require the development of ad hoc parameters.

Is the CEO’s In-House Experience Informative About Audit Risk?

Is the CEO’s In-House Experience Informative About Audit Risk?

Paul Brockman Lehigh University

Gopal V. Krishnan American University; American University – Kogod School of Business

HyeSeung Lee Lehigh University – Department of Accounting

Jesus M. Salas Lehigh University

June 19, 2013

Abstract: 
Very little is known about whether personal characteristics of senior managers convey information about audit risk. We focus on one characteristic of the CEO, the number of years the CEO has worked in the firm before becoming the CEO (CEO in-house experience). We posit that the CEO’s in-house experience mitigates audit risk due to less uncertainty and more familiarity with the auditor. Using audit fees to proxy for audit risk, we find that audit fees are decreasing in CEO’s in-house experience. On average, audit fees are lower by 10% when CEO in-house experience changes from 2 to 6 years. Further, the relation between audit fees and the CEO’s in-house experience is conditional on the overall quality of corporate governance. While the CEO’s in-house experience is insignificant in firms with good governance, it is strongly significant in firms with weak governance.

When Blockholders Leave Feet First: Do Ownership and Control Affect Firm Value?

When Blockholders Leave Feet First: Do Ownership and Control Affect Firm Value?

Bang Dang Nguyen University of Cambridge – Judge Business School

Kasper Meisner Nielsen Hong Kong University of Science & Technology – Department of Finance

June 26, 2013

Abstract: 
This study investigates the effect of ownership and control on firm value using exogenous variation resulting from stock price reactions to the sudden death of individual blockholders. Stock market reactions range from -5% to 4% for inside blockholders as ownership increases and from 0% to -2% for outside blockholders. The difference in market reactions identifies the value of ownership and control while effectively controlling for confounding effects on firm value due to liquidity or anticipated takeover activity. Overall, our results suggest that as ownership increases the beneficial effect of inside blockholders disappears while the beneficial effect of outside blockholders increases.

Departing and Incoming Auditor Incentives, and Auditor-Client Misalignment under Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Korea

Departing and Incoming Auditor Incentives, and Auditor-Client Misalignment under Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Korea

Gil S. Bae Korea University – Department of Accounting

Sanjay Kallapur Indian School of Business

Joon Hwa Rho Chungnam National University – College of Business

June 18, 2013

Abstract: 
In this paper we provide evidence on specific factors that could affect audit quality under mandatory rotation, using data from Korea where mandatory auditor rotation was put into effect in 2006. We find no evidence supporting the “Brillo pad effect” (the argument that departing auditors have incentives to clean up the balance sheet) or the “new broom effect” (the argument that new auditors can find problems that long-standing auditors tend to overlook). On the contrary, departing auditors spend fewer hours just before rotation, consistent with a lack of incentives to maintain quality given the impending rotation. Compared to clients in other mandatory rotations, the clients rotating away from industry specialist auditors have higher audit hours and higher absolute discretionary accruals post-rotation, suggesting there are adverse effects from breaking such auditor-client pairings. Finally we find that Big 4 auditors’ market share continues to increase after mandatory rotation is imposed. Our findings therefore fail to support mandatory rotation.

Financial Reporting and Firm Valuation: Relevance Lost or Relevance Regained?

Financial Reporting and Firm Valuation: Relevance Lost or Relevance Regained?

Luzi Hail University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School

June 19, 2013
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 329-358, 2013

Abstract: 
In this study, I examine whether balance sheet and income statement numbers have lost or regained their relevance over the last 30 years. Institutional and macroeconomic factors like the global trend towards strengthening regulation and harmonizing financial reporting, the extended use of fair values over historical cost, and the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and financial crises make it likely that the role of financial reporting for firm valuation has changed. Following prior research, I estimate four models for the concurrent relation between market value and accounting numbers, and then examine the pattern in explanatory power over time. I find that the loss in relevance of the income statement continues in recent years and is present in a large international sample, in particular in countries with strong institutions. While the overall relevance of the balance sheet remains stable, I find a downward trend during the first sample half, which reverses in the second half, especially in common law countries with strong investor protection, strict disclosure requirements, and integrated markets. Even though several caveats apply, the results suggest that changes in the economy, the institutional environment, and in how firms operate affect the relative importance of accounting information for the use in firm valuation by outside stakeholders.

Do Firms that Wish to Be Acquired Manage Their Earnings? Evidence from Major European Countries

Do Firms that Wish to Be Acquired Manage Their Earnings? Evidence from Major European Countries

Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou Athens University of Economics and Business – Department of Accounting and Finance

Andrianos E. Tsekrekos Athens University of Economics and Business – Department of Accounting and Finance

June 21, 2013
International Review of Financial Analysis, Forthcoming

Abstract: 
In this paper, we examine whether findings on downwards accrual-based earnings management for firms publicly ‘seeking a buyer’ from the US can be extrapolated outside of the US context, given that past research has indicated that the function of the Merger and Acquisition (M&A) markets is highly dependent on the degree of competition in a country. We test for the existence of earnings management (EM) around such events for firms listed in the largest European stock exchanges between 2000 and 2009, and get evidence that downwards earnings management around ‘seeking buyer’ announcements more strongly holds for the country with the most competitive market for corporate control in our sample, that is the UK. We consider this finding indicative of the fact that a competitive M&A environment may induce earnings management-prone behavior. We further testify significantly positive abnormal returns around ‘seeking buyer’ announcements for firms from the UK, but limited such evidence for the other countries, a finding we also attribute to differences in competition and uneven split of benefits among bidders and targets in M&A markets. Finally, we find that EM positively affects abnormal returns around ‘seeking buyer’ announcements, indicating that market participants tend to compensate for upwards EM, regardless of the degree of competition of the M&A market of a country.

Shaping Innovation Processes Through Humor

Shaping Innovation Processes Through Humor

Marcel Bogers University of Southern Denmark

Trine Heinemann University of Helsinki

June 18, 2013
Proceedings of the Participatory Innovation Conference; June 18-20, 2013; Lahti, Finland; pp. 325-329

Abstract: 
In this paper we present a case study of how humor is employed at the micro-level of collaborative innovation processes. Based on data from workshops in which participants work together to construct new business models for a particular company, we employ the method of Conversation Analysis to find that humor (laughter) may be an important condition for the acceptance of proposals at the interactional micro-level of innovation processes. A particular finding is that company-internal representatives’ use of humor differs from company-external participants in terms of their orientation to having different rights and responsibilities in the innovation process.

Earnings Management to Avoid Additional Disclosures: Evidence from Germany

Earnings Management to Avoid Additional Disclosures: Evidence from Germany

Joerg R. Werner Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH

Hanno Dachwitz Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH

March 28, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper sheds light on measures undertaken by firms to avoid additional mandatory disclosure requirements. Basically, the firms analyzed in our setting have a choice between laying off employees or exerting some kind of earnings management to avoid increased disclosures. Based on a sample of German firms, we empirically show that earnings management is more likely to occur compared to other measures under such circumstances. The paper contributes to the literature dealing with costs of mandatory disclosures.

Going Beyond Heroic-Leaders in Development

Going Beyond Heroic-Leaders in Development

Matthew Andrews Harvard University – Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

June 10, 2013
HKS Working Paper No. RWP13-021

Abstract: 
Leadership is an under-studied topic in the international development literature. When the topic is broached it is usually in support of what might be called a ‘hero orthodoxy’: One or other individual is identified as the hero of a specific achievement. The current article offers a three part argument why this orthodoxy is problematic and wrong for many developing countries, however. It suggests first that heroes have not emerged in many countries for a long period and individuals who may have been considered heroes in the past often turned out less than heroic. It posits second that heroes are actually at least as much the product of their contexts as they turned out to be the shapers of such. It proposes third that the stories about hero-leaders doing special things mask the way such special things emerge from the complex interactions of many actors – some important and some mundane. Leadership, it appears, is about multi-agent groups and not single-agent autocrats. The conclusion posits that romantic notions of heroic-leadership in development become less convincing when one appreciates these three arguments. It calls development theorists and practitioners to go beyond the heroic-leader perspective.

Crying Wolf Leadership Style and Ways

Crying Wolf Leadership Style and Ways

Kim Cheng Patrick Low BusinesscrAFT Consultancy (Asia Pacific); University of South Australia; Bang College of Business – Kazakhstan Institute of Management; Universiti Brunei Darussalam

July 3, 2013
Business Journal for Entrepreneurs, Volume 2013, Issue 2 p. 51-67

Abstract: 
The well-known tale involves a shepherd boy who often misleads or deceives nearby villagers into thinking a wolf is attacking his flock. In this paper, as the title suggests, through literature review and discussion, the academician-practitioner examines the features, the workings and the various ways of crying wolf leadership. It is basically about leaders who keep on crying, “Wolf! Wolf!”, urging and exhorting their people of crisis ahead or that the sky might fall sooner than expected. The associated advantages and disadvantages of such a leadership style are also examined.

Do CEOs and Directors Get Sick of Attending Meetings?

Do CEOs and Directors Get Sick of Attending Meetings?

Stephen Gray University of Queensland – Business School; Duke University – Fuqua School of Business; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

John Nowland City University of Hong Kong

June 26, 2013

Abstract: 
This study examines whether CEO and director attendance is affected by additional board and committee meetings. Using a hand-collected Australian dataset of 21,691 observations of the number of board and committee meetings held and attended by directors from 2004 to 2007, we find that attendance rates for both outside and inside directors decrease (non-random absences increase) when they are required to attend more board meetings. The marginal effect is that the average outside (inside) director has a 14% (12%) likelihood of missing an additional board meeting. Further analysis shows that the negative relationship between board meetings and attendance rates is consistent across directorships in a range of firms, including when more meetings are associated with poor performance, M&A activity and CEO turnover. The results for committee meetings are mixed, indicating that director attendance is not consistent across different types of meetings. In summary, our analysis indicates that any benefits firms obtain from holding additional meetings are being eroded by lower director attendance, a result that should be of particular interest to shareholders and policymakers.

Promises and Lies: Can Observers Detect Deception?

Promises and Lies: Can Observers Detect Deception

Jingnan Cecilia Chen George Mason University – Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES)

Daniel Houser George Mason University – Department of Economics

May 2, 2013
GMU Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science Department of Economics Paper No. 13-14

Abstract: 
Although economic and social relationships can involve deception (Gneezy 2005), such relationships are often governed by informal contracts that require trust (Berg et al.1995). While important advances have been made concerning deception in economics, the research has focused little on written forms of communication. Are there certain systematic cues that signal written communications as dishonest? Are those signals accurately detected and used by message receivers? We fill this gap by studying messages written in a novel three-person trust game; (we call it the “Mistress Game”). We find that: (1) messages that use encompassing terms, or a greater number of words, are significantly more likely to be viewed as promises; and (2) promises that mention money are significantly more likely to be trusted. Notwithstanding the latter finding, we find senders who mention money within their promises to be significantly less likely to keep their word than those who do not; observers respond to cues but in the wrong way.

Professionalism in Business: Insights from Ancient Philosophy

Professionalism in Business: Insights from Ancient Philosophy

Lila Despotidou Athens University of Economics and Business – Department of Management Science and Technology

Gregory Prastacos Stevens Institute of Technology – Wesley J. Howe School of Technology Management

June 18, 2013
Howe School Research Paper No. 2013-13

Abstract: 
Business schools have the responsibility to inspire professional culture in future managers. This means that they have to provide them not only with the expertise, knowledge and skills required in their field of specialization, but also with a sense of responsibility toward others and society at large. This need has been increasingly evident during the period of the global financial crisis, and a number of initiatives have been reported by business schools worldwide to address the issue. In this paper we examine the issue of professionalism in business management from two perspectives: business practice, and relation to ancient philosophy. Drawing from the literature, we propose a framework defining professionalism as composed of three patterns: a) possession of a systematic body of knowledge, b) commitment to a good broader than self-interest, and c) an overall ethical character of the activity and ethical conduct. We show how these patterns are reflected to the expectations that corporations have from business practitioners. We further demonstrate that substantial elements of business professionalism are strongly related to core values and principles introduced in the social and political thought of ancient philosophers, and thus suggest that ancient philosophy could be used as a means for inspiring professionalism in business managers.

More than Meets the Eye: Convertible Bond Issuers’ Concurrent Transactions

More than Meets the Eye: Convertible Bond Issuers’ Concurrent Transactions

Brian J. Henderson George Washington University – Department of Finance

Bo Zhao George Washington University

June 4, 2013

Abstract: 
In recent years, over 60% of convertible bond issuers conduct concurrent transactions; including share repurchases, call option purchases, warrant sales, seasoned equity offerings, and stock lending program initiations. We show that the determinants of issuers’ choice of concurrent transactions vary; and include controlling earnings dilution, the supply of capital available from convertible arbitrageurs, and investment opportunities. Our results suggest that in the convertible bond market, the influence of capital supply, as measured by flows to convertible arbitrage hedge funds, extends beyond the issuance decision and influences the security design and use of concurrent transactions. Additionally, the announcement effects suggest that concurrent transactions signal managers’ information regarding future earnings.

News-Driven Return Reversals Liquidity Provision Ahead of Earnings News; six-fold increase in short-term return reversals during earnings announcements relative to non-announcement periods

News-Driven Return Reversals: Liquidity Provision Ahead of Earnings News

Eric C. So Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) – Sloan School of Management

Sean Wang University of North Carolina – Kenan-Flagler Business School

June 7, 2013

Abstract: 
This study documents a six-fold increase in short-term return reversals during earnings announcements relative to non-announcement periods. Following prior research, we use reversals as a proxy for expected returns market makers demand for providing liquidity. Our findings suggest that market makers demand higher expected returns prior to earnings announcements because of increased inventory risks that stem from holding net positions through the release of anticipated earnings news. These findings indicate that increases in market makers’ inventory risks result in reduced liquidity through a channel distinct from adverse selection risks and that pre-announcement demand for liquidity provision results in predictable variation in earnings announcement returns. We also use pre-announcement option prices to show that return reversals increase when there is greater expected volatility during earnings announcements. Collectively, our findings suggest that uncertainty regarding anticipated information events elicits predictable increases in expected returns to liquidity provision and that these increases significantly affect the dynamics and information content of market prices.

Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make Informed Investment Decisions? Target firm returns are reduced following SWF investment

Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make Informed Investment Decisions?

Bong Soo Lee Florida State University

Francis Haeuck In Monash University – Department of Accounting and Finance; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

June 9, 2013

Abstract: 
Recent studies find that target firm returns are reduced following sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment. Although risk is also reduced following SWF investment, they find that SWF investment is associated with a reduction in the compensation of risk.In this paper, weexamine the hypothesis that sovereign weal funds’ poor performance is partly due to their poor information about the target firms and find some support for the hypothesis.

A Review and Synthesis of ‘Cost Stickiness’ Literature

A Review and Synthesis of ‘Cost Stickiness’ Literature

Mahfuja Malik Boston University

November 9, 2012

Abstract: 
Traditional cost accounting holds the assumption that cost changes proportionately with activity. Anderson et al. (2003) show that cost increases more when activity rises than decreases less when activity falls by an equivalent amount, a behavior that they refer to as “cost stickiness”. By following Anderson et al. (2003) researchers investigate the determinants, consequences and different aspects of cost stickiness. However, some studies raise questions about the validity of the inference made by Anderson et al. (2003). Over the last few years many authors highlight some new aspects such as earnings forecasts error, agency problem and earnings management that relate to cost stickiness. The objective of this paper is to review and synthesize the growing body of research on cost stickiness. Lack of theoretical support, merely insights provided by the literature and some inconclusive findings suggest that there are ample research opportunities to improve the understanding in this area.

Are Aggressive Reporting Practices Indicative of Risk-Taking Corporate Environments?

Are Aggressive Reporting Practices Indicative of Risk-Taking Corporate Environments?

Mary Margaret Frank University of Virginia – Darden School of Business

Luann J. Lynch University of Virginia – Darden School of Business

Sonja O. Rego Indiana University – Kelley School of Business

Rong Zhao University of Calgary

March 31, 2012
Darden Business School Working Paper No. 1066846

Abstract: 
We examine whether firms with aggressive financial and tax reporting also have greater risk-taking corporate environments. We use investing, financing and operating policies and measures of firm risk to assess a firm’s risk-taking environment. We separate our analyses into the periods before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) because prior evidence suggests SOX affected reporting and risk-taking practices. Our results provide strong evidence that before SOX, firms with greater risk-taking environments also engaged in more aggressive reporting. Our results also suggest that SOX eliminated the positive association between corporate risk-taking environments and aggressive reporting. Results from shareholder valuation tests indicate that in the pre-SOX time period, shareholders valued aggressive reporting – but not corporate risk-taking – at a premium. However, the passage of SOX substantially altered how shareholders assess aggressive reporting and corporate risk-taking.

China’s State-Owned Enterprises: How Much Do We Know? From CNOOC to Its Siblings

China’s State-Owned Enterprises: How Much Do We Know? From CNOOC to Its Siblings

Duanjie Chen University of Calgary – The School of Public Policy

June 6, 2013
SPP Research Paper No. 6-19

Abstract: 
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are sometimes compared to Canadian Crown corporations, such as VIA Rail or the CBC. But that comparison is not only profoundly inaccurate, it can also be a dangerous assumption to make when crafting Canadian economic policy. China’s SOEs have been actively buying up interests in major Canadian resource firms. But that phenomenon has much more serious implications for Canada than if these were, say, state-owned European firms, such as Norway’s Statoil. China’s SOEs do not operate by the normal rules of commerce. They are, in fact, a very powerful tool of the Chinese government’s industrial policy, which is aimed at a ruthless expansion of its global economic empire. The spectacular growth of China’s SOEs over the last two decades, at a rate unrivalled by virtually any other sector on earth, has been driven by the will of the Chinese government, which provides cheap or free inputs — such as access to capital and real estate — in order to create globally dominant corporate powers. There is also the Chinese competitive advantage that comes with not just lower wages for workers but also behaviour that would be considered irresponsible in a Western context. Placing a lower priority on human rights, the environment, social justice and corporate rectitude give China and its SOEs an edge that have helped them in their goal of leapfrogging competing world economic powers, including Canada. Without these explicit and implicit subsidies, China’s SOEs have actually proven to be far less economically competitive than their private-sector rivals. Chinese SOEs are not publicly accountable the way that Crown corporations in Canada are. Chinese SOEs are run by appointees of the Communist party, whose first duty is to the state, the majority or even sole shareholder of SOEs. Unlike Canada’s Crown corporations, which are designed to fill in market-failure gaps or provide public service, China’s SOEs are permitted to chase profits in sectors that do not even fall within their primary mandate. And unlike Canada, China jealously guards the sectors in which its SOEs exert absolute or strong control, disallowing any private-sector competitors — domestic or foreign — free entry. When Canada’s federal government last December granted approval to the takeover of Nexen Inc. it made it clear that this would be the “end of a trend” of Chinese SOEs controlling acquisition of major Canadian energy firms. Such takeovers would be allowed only in exceptional circumstances from now on. That is how it should be. Canada’s business sector should contribute to market-driven economic growth, through efficient management and upright corporate behavior. It should not be allowed to become an instrument in China’s distorted and often disreputable drive toward global hegemony.

Asia’s Enron: Satyam (Sanskrit Word for Truth)

Asia’s Enron: Satyam (Sanskrit Word for Truth)

Elisabetta Basilico University of St. Gallen

Hugh Grove University of Denver

Lorenzo Patelli University of Denver – School of Accountancy; SDA Bocconi; Benedictine College

2012
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 2012

Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyze the 2009 scandal of Satyam, one of India’s largest information technology companies and provider of computer software and business process outsourcing to large companies around the world; including General Motors, Nestlé, and General Electric. We discuss financial and non-financial red flags. Specifically, we apply five financial fraud prediction measures and examine corporate governance elements. The results of our analyses suggest the importance of integrating financial and non-financial indicators. Supplementing financial indicators with non-financial red flags enables us to present the reverse KISS principle by Hilb (2005).

MD&A Disclosure and the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern

MD&A Disclosure and the Firm’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern

William J. Mayew Duke University – Fuqua School of Business

Mani Sethuraman Duke University – Fuqua School of Business

Mohan Venkatachalam Duke University – Fuqua School of Business

March 22, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper explores the role of textual disclosures in the MD&A section of a firm’s SEC 10K filing to predict a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern. Using a sample of firms that filed for bankruptcy over the period 1995-2011 and a matched set of control firms we find that both management’s opinion about going concern stated in the MD&A and the linguistic tone of the MD&A together provide significant explanatory power in predicting whether a firm will cease as a going concern. Moreover, the predictive ability of MD&A disclosure is incremental to financial ratios, auditor going concern opinion, and market based variables. The striking feature of our findings is that the information in MD&A disclosures is more useful in predicting bankruptcy relative to financial ratios three years prior to bankruptcy. This suggests that MD&A disclosures are more timely than financial ratios and hence, a leading indicator of going concern problems. Our findings have important implications for current standard setter deliberations on whether to mandate qualitative disclosures about management’s assessment of the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.

Distracted Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?

Distracted Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?

Antonio Falato Federal Reserve Board

Dalida Kadyrzhanova University of Maryland

Ugur Lel Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University – Department of Finance, Insurance, and Business Law

May 31, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper examines the impact of independent director busyness on firm value in a setting that addresses a key challenge that the board of directors is an endogenously determined institution. We use the deaths of directors and CEOs as a natural experiment to generate exogenous variation in the time and resources available to independent directors at interlocked firms. The sudden loss of such key co-employees is an ‘attention shock’ because it increases the board committee workload for some independent directors at the interlocked firm – the ‘treatment group,’ but not others – the ‘control group.’ In a hand-collected sample of 2,551 (592) firms that share a non-deceased independent director with 633 (189) firms subject to director (CEO) deaths, difference-in-difference estimates reveal that investors react negatively to these attention shocks. There is a significant negative stock market reaction of -0.79% (-0.95%) for director-interlocked firms in the treatment group, but no reaction for those in the control group. The treatment effect is significantly magnified by interlocking directors’ busyness (e.g., board size and number of outside directorships), the importance of their roles in the firm (e.g., type of committee membership), and their degree of actual independence (e.g., entrenchment). Overall, these results provide direct evidence that director attention shocks are interpreted as negative events for firms and that independent directors’ busyness entails costs for shareholders.

Are Investors Guided by the News Disclosed by Companies or by Journalists?

Are Investors Guided by the News Disclosed by Companies or by Journalists?

Zilu Shang ICMA Centre, Henley Business School

Chris Brooks University of Reading – ICMA Centre

Rachel McCloy University of Plymouth – School of Psychology

June 1, 2013

Abstract: 
Most previous studies demonstrating the influential role of the textual information released by the media on stock market performance have concentrated on earnings-related disclosures. By contrast, this paper focuses on disposal announcements, so that the impacts of listed companies’ announcements and journalists’ stories can be compared concerning the same events. Consistent with previous findings, negative words, rather than those expressing other types of sentiment, statistically significantly affect adjusted returns and detrended trading volumes. However, extending previous studies, the results of this paper indicate that shareholders’ decisions are mainly guided by the negative sentiment in listed companies’ announcements rather than that in journalists’ stories. Furthermore, this effect is restricted to the announcement day. The average market reaction – measured by adjusted returns – is inversely related only when the announcements are ignored by the media, but the dispersion of market reaction – measured by detrended trading volume – is positively affected only when announcements are followed up by journalists.

Materiality Guidance of the Major Auditing Firms

Materiality Guidance of the Major Auditing Firms

Aasmund Eilifsen Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) – Department of Accounting, Auditing, and Law

William F. Messier Jr.University of Nevada, Las Vegas – Department of Accounting; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) – Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law

June 5, 2013

Abstract: 
This paper examines the materiality guidance for eight of the largest U.S. auditing firms. Knowledge of how materiality guidance is integrated into a firm’s methodology is important for accounting and auditing researchers. Our results show a high level of consistency across the firms in terms of the quantitative benchmarks (e.g., income before taxes, total assets or revenues, and total equity) used to determine overall materiality, the related percentages applied to those benchmarks, the percentages applied to overall materiality for determining tolerable misstatement, and what constitutes a clearly trivial misstatement. We also find that the firms’ guidance for evaluating detected misstatements including qualitative factors and firm guidance for group audits is consistent across firms. However, there are differences in how the firms consider the possibility of undetected misstatements when evaluating detected misstatements. The results offer insights into implementation of standards that provides valuable information for future materiality research as well informing future archival and behavioral research.

Former Politicians as Corporate Directors: Good for Business?

Former Politicians as Corporate Directors: Good for Business?

Stephen Gray University of Queensland – Business School; Duke University – Fuqua School of Business; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Iman Harymawan Airlangga University

John Nowland City University of Hong Kong

May 27, 2013

Abstract: 
International studies suggest that directors with political connections provide significant benefits to shareholders. Yet, whether this is the case in the political and business environment in Australia is unknown. In this study, we examine the prevalence of former politicians as non-executive directors in ASX-listed companies and the market reaction to their appointment. In our sample of 1,561 companies in 2007, we find that former federal, state, local and foreign politicians hold directorships in 5.32% of firms. Our event study of new director appointments shows that the market reaction to the appointment of former politicians is significantly lower than non-politicians. This indicates that shareholders do not value the expertise that former politicians bring to corporate boards in Australia, particularly when their political parties are not in power and when they have less political and director experience. In summary, we find no evidence that former politician directors possess valuable political connections in Australia.