Gaming the Float: How Managers Respond to EPS-Based Incentives
July 12, 2013 Leave a comment
Gaming the Float: How Managers Respond to EPS-Based Incentives
Alan D. Crane Rice University – Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business
Andrew Koch University of Pittsburgh – Finance Group
Chishen Wei University of Texas at Austin
June 27, 2013
Abstract:
We show that the likelihood of meeting earnings per share (EPS) forecasts is mechanically positively related to the number of shares outstanding. As a result, managers can affect the long run probability of meeting future EPS forecasts without managing earnings or affecting analysts’ forecasts. We find that firms with unpredictable earnings and firms with managers that have compensation more sensitive to EPS outcomes have more shares outstanding. To address causality, we find that an exogenous drop in the likelihood of meeting a forecast causes managers to increase shares outstanding, primarily through stock splits. Following an increase in shares, accounting and real earnings management drop, and the firm meets EPS forecasts more frequently going forward. Our results also offer a new explanation for stock splits; and provide evidence of a channel that relates EPS incentives to analysts’ forecast errors, stock liquidity, and price levels.