China’s shadow banks at risk of a property crash; Capital outflows and falling property values could create cascading losses; “Everyone focuses on the government’s ability, not its willingness, for bailouts. We are all too complacent.”

China’s shadow banks at risk of a property crash

By Henny Sender

Capital outflows and falling property values could create cascading losses

Delegates from Hong Kong who made the pilgrimage to the mainland to take part in the National People’s Congress in mid-March came away impressed with the capability of Chinese president Xi Jinping, the most powerful leader of China since Deng Xiaoping. “He will never let the economy fall apart,” one delegate said.

Their only doubt? The outsized vigour with which Mr Xi is pursuing his anti-corruption campaign. This delegate complained bitterly about being put up at a three star hotel in which even bottled water was not supplied, let alone whisky or fine wine.

Meanwhile, across the Pacific, many people have sounded the alarm about Beijing’s ability to rein in credit growth and rebalance the economy more towards domestic demand and services and away from commodity-intensive fixed asset investment. But in Hong Kong and China itself, faith in the ability of the government to correct the excesses created by the 2009 stimulus programme has, if anything, increased under the current regime.

Lehman moment

In spite of reports by alarmist analysts that the shadow banking system is shaping up to be the country’s “Lehman” or “Bear Stearns” moment, or is the equivalent of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US, most people here believe that shadow banking does not represent a systemic threat.

They point out that the shadow banks are the product of a system in which interest rates and the price of money are controlled and kept artificially low both for savers and privileged borrowers, notably the state-owned enterprises. So, as China eases restrictions on rates, the shadow banks will naturally atrophy.

The optimists further believe that there will be defaults and disputes over how losses from those defaults are to be apportioned, but, ultimately, the allocation of capital will be improved and credit priced more appropriately. After all, China has done a brilliant job managing its economy for the past two decades, through challenging times including the Asian financial crisis and the US-driven global financial crisis. China is a lot less scary now than it was in the mid-nineties.

The argument in favour of a manageable challenge is this. Borrowers in the shadow banking system are a diverse lot. Any difficulty is likely to be concentrated in products that raised money for resource and commodities companies plagued by falling prices and overcapacity.

That group includes coal miners and steelmakers. That, though, is a small group. So-called local government borrowing platforms that account for a bigger share of shadow bank products do have issues, but those are a matter of liquidity not solvency. Develop a municipal bond market, stretch the average maturity from under two years to 10, lower the yield and the issues go away.

Ghost cities

That leaves a third group – the property companies. The ghost cities that are the subject of scare headlines in the west represent a small minority of the total construction, the optimists believe. After all, just over 20 years ago, many believed that now prosperous Pudong was a ghost town.

What happens to property prices will play a big part in determining the degree to which shadow banking is resolved in a positive way. If property prices rise too quickly, social stability becomes an issue. But if they fall too precipitously, there may be an avalanche of defaults in wealth management products issued by developers.

If the bears are proved right, it will be because of a combination of factors starting with a big decline in property values. The bear argument has several components. Start with the reversal in China’s currency policy, which had seen the renminbi steadily appreciate over the past few years.

Today, the sudden depreciation in the renminbi makes it less attractive to hold either the Chinese currency or renminbi-denominated investments in China. That is particularly true of property, which has long been the favoured investment destination of the growing number of plutocrats on the mainland.

Now combine that with curbs on corruption, which makes it even more compelling to put money outside China. Sure, China still has capital controls, which means that the outflows cannot assume the massive proportions of, say, Indonesia during the Asian financial crisis when the rupiah plummeted. Nonetheless, the combination of capital outflows and a drop in property values could create cascading losses in the shadow banks.

But today most people expect the government will orchestrate a more benign outcome. “We have become too accustomed to bailouts,” warns one prominent Hong Kong credit investor. “Everyone focuses on the government’s ability, not its willingness, for bailouts. We are all too complacent.”