Competition for Talent Under Performance Manipulation: CEOs on Steroids
December 4, 2013 Leave a comment
Competition for Talent Under Performance Manipulation: CEOs on Steroids
Ivan Marinovic Stanford Graduate School of Business
Paul Povel University of Houston – Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business
October 22, 2013
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 160
Abstract:
We study how competition for talent affects CEO compensation, taking into consideration that CEO decisions are not contractible, CEO skills or talent are not observable, and CEOs can manipulate performance as measured by outsiders. Firms compete to appoint a CEO by offering contracts that generate large rents for the CEO. However, the incentive problems restrict how such rents can be created. We derive the equilibrium compensation contract offered by the firms, and we describe how the outcome is affected. Competition for talent leads to excessively high-powered performance compensation. Competition for talent can thus explain the increase in pay-performance sensitivity over the last few decades, and the extremely high-powered compensation packages observed in some markets. Given the high-powered incentive compensation, CEOs exert inefficiently high levels of effort and also distort the performance measure excessively. If the cost of manipulating performance is low, competition for talent may reduce the overall surplus, compared with a setup in which one firm negotiates with one potential CEO (and the firm extracts the rents). We discuss possible remedies, including regulatory limits to incentive compensation.