Earnings Management and Annual General Meetings: The Role of Managerial Entrenchment
April 10, 2013 Leave a comment
Earnings Management and Annual General Meetings: The Role of Managerial Entrenchment
John Banko University of Florida
Melissa B. Frye University of Central Florida – College of Business Administration
Weishen Wang College of Charleston
Ann Marie Whyte University of Central Florida
May 2013
Financial Review, Vol. 48, Issue 2, pp. 259-282, 2013
Abstract:
We examine earnings management around the annual general meeting (AGM) and assess the influence of managerial entrenchment. Consistent with prior research, we show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns surrounding AGMs regardless of the level of managerial entrenchment. We find evidence of significant earnings manipulation primarily among entrenched managers. Specifically, they manage abnormal accruals downward two quarters prior to the AGM and significantly increase abnormal accruals in the quarter immediately before the AGM. Our evidence is consistent with AGMs triggering managers to disseminate information in a manner that shapes the market’s perception of the firm.
