Restraining Overconfident CEOs
April 11, 2013 Leave a comment
Restraining Overconfident CEOs
Suman Banerjee Nanyang Business School
Mark Humphery-Jenner University of New South Wales – Australian School of Business; Financial Research Network (FIRN); Nuvest Capital
Vikram K. Nanda Georgia Institute of Technology – College of Management
March 26, 2013
Abstract:
Prior literature posits that while some CEO overconfidence may benefit shareholders, high levels of overconfidence do not. We investigate whether improvements in governance can help to mitigate the adverse effects of overconfidence while preserving its positive aspects. We use the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act as a natural experiment to examine whether improvements in regulation and governance help to mitigate investment distortions and moderate risk-taking tendencies of the more overconfident CEOs. We conduct tests using options-based proxies for CEO overconfidence. The results indicate that, after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduced investment, improved performance and market value, reduced their risk-exposure, increased dividends and substantially improved long-term performance following acquisitions. We also find that these SOX-related benefits are concentrated in the firms that were SOX non-compliant prior to its passage. While the beneficial aspects of SOX in restraining overconfident CEOs may have been an unintended consequence, the message of our paper is simple: CEO over-confidence can be monitored and regulated — just like any other CEO attribute.
