Entrenchment or Incentive? CEO Employment Contracts and Acquisition Decisions
April 23, 2013 Leave a comment
Entrenchment or Incentive? CEO Employment Contracts and Acquisition Decisions
Jing Zhao North Caroliona State University – Poole College of Management
April 15, 2013
Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming
Abstract:
A long-standing controversy is whether CEO employment contracts insulate inferior managers from discipline leading to shareholder wealth destruction, or whether contracts alleviate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-enhancing decisions. Using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO employment contracts during 1993-2005, I find that acquirers with a CEO contract obtain better announcement returns, pay lower premiums for their targets, garner superior long-run post-acquisition operating performance, and undertake riskier deals than acquirers without a contract. Further investigation of individual contract provisions reveals substantial heterogeneity. Specifically, the fixed term rather than at will contract, longer contract duration, long-term equity incentives, accelerated stock and option vesting provisions in severance arrangement, and more refined definitions of just cause (good reason) for CEO termination (resignation) alleviate managerial risk aversion, reduce contracting ambiguity, and motivate value-creating decisions.
