Board Games: Timing of Independent Directors’ Dissent in China
April 24, 2013 Leave a comment
Board Games: Timing of Independent Directors’ Dissent in China
Harvard Business School
Harvard University – Strategy Unit
April 18, 2013
Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 13-089
Abstract:
This paper examines the circumstances under which so-called “independent” directors voice their independent views on public boards in a sample of Chinese firms. Controlling for firm and board characteristics, we find that independent directors’ dissent is associated with breakdown of directors’ interpersonal ties with board chairpersons, who locate at the center of the board bureaucracy in China. In particular, independent directors tend to “time” their dissent into a restricted set of socially-appropriate circumstances, either when the board chairperson who appoints the independent director has left the board, or when the voting occurs at the end of board “games” that corresponds to a 60-day window prior to departure of the board chairperson or departure of the independent director herself. The endgame effect is particularly strong: 27% of the dissent was issued at board “endgames” which represent merely 4% of independent directors’ average tenure. While directors with foreign experience are more likely to dissent, we do not find that academics, accounting and law professionals are significantly more active. We also show that dissent is consequential, to the director and the firm. Although dissent has no significant marginal effect on the total number of board seats received subsequently by an independent director, it significantly increases the chance for a director to exit the director labor market. Firms suffer an economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.97% around announcement of dissent. Literature has suggested that dissent might be reflecting of diverse viewpoints, perhaps beneficial in and of itself through reducing variability of firm performance, however we do not find this offsetting beneficial effect to be strong.
