Local Institutions, Audit Quality, and Financial Fraud of US-Listed Foreign Firms
May 14, 2013 Leave a comment
Local Institutions, Audit Quality, and Financial Fraud of US-Listed Foreign Firms
Lei Chen London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) – Department of Accounting
Jan 16, 2013
Abstract:
Using data on shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits in the US, I investigate financial misconducts of US-listed foreign firms. After controlling for type I errors (e.g. frivolous lawsuits), I document that firms domiciled in the countries with weak corporate governance were more likely to commit fraud, but such relation could be moderated by the presence of Big 4 auditors. Investors automatically adjusted for type II errors (e.g. undiscovered fraud) when valuating the stocks of non-sued firms. That is, non-sued firms that shared the same countries of origin with their sued peers experienced valuation declines around class periods end dates (the dates when the scandals were exposed rather than the dates when the litigation was filed). Investors relied on audit quality to form their expectations about the severity of type II errors, and thus posed less negative spillovers on firms with Big 4 auditors, especially when the firms were from countries with weak corporate governance. Taken together, my results suggest that a listing on US exchanges does not fully compensate weak local institutions; voluntarily bonding to more stringent audit process has an incremental effect on protecting shareholder interests, and enhances the confidence of investors in firms’ financial integrity.
