The Unintended Consequences of High Expectations and Pressure on New CEOs
May 24, 2013 Leave a comment
The Unintended Consequences of High Expectations and Pressure on New CEOs
Kevin Krieger University of West Florida
James S. Ang Florida State University
April/May 2013
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 40, Issue 3-4, pp. 501-526, 2013
Abstract:
We provide empirical tests of a general version of targeting theory that greater scrutiny could lead to executive abuses. Our results show that new CEOs under higher expectations or pressure are more likely to report meeting analyst forecasts; however, this apparent superior performance dissipates after excluding firms having characteristics synonymous with earnings manipulation. We find evidence that new CEOs under greater pressure are considerably more likely to engage in manipulation while the link between expectations and manipulation is much weaker. The results are strongest for new CEOs whose firms report meeting forecasts and do not “walk down” earnings estimates.
