Institutional Holding Periods; Our results are consistent with the agency problem that arises when clients cannot distinguish when a manager is “actively doing nothing” versus “simply doing nothing” as well as managers having overconfidence in their own short-term trading ability
March 1, 2013 Leave a comment
Saint Louis University – John Cook School of Business
Cornell University
Indiana University Bloomington – Department of Finance
February 20, 2013
Abstract:
We find wide dispersion in trade holding periods for institutional money managers and pension funds, using a large database of fund-level transactions. All of the institutional funds execute round-trip trades lasting over a year; 96% of them also execute trades lasting less than one month, although short-duration trades have negative returns on average. We find only limited evidence that institutions choose trade holding periods based on portfolio optimization and no evidence that short-duration institutional trades are driven by the disposition effect. Our results are consistent with the agency problem that arises when clients cannot distinguish when a manager is “actively doing nothing” versus “simply doing nothing” as well as managers having overconfidence in their own short-term trading ability.
