Corporate Divestitures and Family Control
September 12, 2013 Leave a comment
Corporate Divestitures and Family Control
Emilie R. Feldman University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School
Raphael H. Amit University of Pennsylvania – Management Department
Belen Villalonga New York University (NYU) – Leonard N. Stern School of Business
August 5, 2013
Abstract:
This paper investigates the propensity of family firms to undertake divestitures and the performance consequences of these transactions, drawing on behavioral and agency theory. Using hand-collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm-year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than their non-family counterparts to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non-family CEOs. We also show that family firms are less likely than non-family firms to divest unrelated businesses, though there is no difference in the relative propensities of these two types of companies to undertake related divestitures. However, the divestitures undertaken by family firms, particularly those run by family-CEOs, are associated with significantly higher post-divestiture performance than those undertaken by non-family firms. Taken together, these findings contribute to research on corporate strategy and family firms by showing that owners’ and managers’ identities help explain why divestitures are underutilized despite the value they create.
