The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?
February 24, 2014 Leave a comment
THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association
Vol. 89, No. 1 DOI: 10.2308/accr-50601 2014 pp. 113–145
The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?
ABSTRACT: To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the
auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter
requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit
committees appear to be ‘‘fully’’ independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs
often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of
U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a
negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that
firms whose audit committees have ‘‘friendship’’ ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit
services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue
going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are
present. On the other hand, social ties formed through ‘‘advice networks’’ do not seem to
hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.
