Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia?
March 2, 2014 Leave a comment
Does the Capital Market Punish Managerial Myopia?
Jamie Tong
University of Western Australia; Financial Research Network (FIRN)
Feida Zhang
Murdoch University – School of Business
February 14, 2014
FIRN Research Paper
Abstract:
The extant literature provides conflicting arguments on whether the capital market punishes managers’ myopic behavior. Stein (1988, 1989) argues that the capital market is myopic and will push managers to behave myopically. In contrast, Jensen (1988) believes that the capital market is efficient and will punish managerial myopia. However, empirical studies on how the stock market reacts to managerial myopia are scarce. This study aims to fill in this gap by examining how the capital market reacts to managerial myopia. Using managers’ cutting R&D to meet short-term earnings goals as a research setting, this study reveals that the capital market actually penalizes managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Our results are consistent with Jensen’s (1988) contention that the security market is not shortsighted. Additionally, we document that compensation, especially cash compensation, could be one of the reasons why managers behave myopically.
