Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?
July 14, 2013 Leave a comment
Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?
Kai Wai Hui Hong Kong University of Science & Technology – Department of Accounting
Steven R. Matsunaga University of Oregon
June 1, 2013
Abstract:
In this study, we provide insight into the economic determinants and consequences of disclosure quality by examining the extent to which boards consider disclosure quality to be an important responsibility of the CEO and CFO. Specifically, we examine whether CEO and CFO pay is related to the firm’s disclosure quality, as measured using the index from Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) and management forecast accuracy. We find changes in cash compensation for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in each measure of disclosure quality. We also investigate factors that influence the extent to which boards reward the managers for disclosure quality. We find that the relation is stronger for high growth firms and firms that have stronger governance structures. Overall, our findings provide empirical evidence that boards’ view disclosure quality to be an important determinant of firm value and provide managers financial incentives to provide high quality disclosures.
