Governance Through Threat: Does Short Selling Improve Internal Governance?
July 16, 2013 Leave a comment
Governance Through Threat: Does Short Selling Improve Internal Governance?
Massimo Massa INSEAD – Finance
Bohui Zhang The University of New South Wales – School of Banking and Finance; Financial Research Network (FIRN)
Hong Zhang INSEAD – Finance
July 9, 2013
INSEAD Working Paper No. 2013/83/FIN
Abstract:
We explore the relationship between internal governance and the disciplining mechanisms created by the threat of short selling (i.e. “short-selling potential”). We argue that the presence of short selling increases the cost of agency problems for shareholders and incentivizes them to improve internal governance. Our stock-level tests across 23 developed countries during 2003-2009 confirm that the threat of short selling significantly enhances the quality of internal governance. This effect is stronger for financially constrained firms and more pronounced in countries with weak institutional environments. The governance impact of short selling leads to an improvement in firms’ operating performance.
