Geography and CEO Luck: Where Do CEOs Tend to be Lucky?

Geography and CEO Luck: Where Do CEOs Tend to be Lucky?

Pandej Chintrakarn Mahidol University International College (MUIC)

Napatsorn Jiraporn State University of New York at New Paltz

Pornsit Jiraporn Pennsylvania State University – SGPS; National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), Mahidol University, College of Management (CMMU), Bangkok, Thailand

July 10, 2013

CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing (Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010). We extend Bebchuk et al. (2010) by investigating the geographic peer effects of CEO luck. Our evidence shows that a CEO is significantly more likely to be lucky when other CEOs in the surrounding area are not lucky. It appears that a CEO tends to practice opportunistic timing of option grants when such a practice is less prevalent and thus less noticeable in the nearby area, probably in order to avoid detection. We estimate that the marginal geographic effect on a given CEO’s luck is 18.36%, which is both statistically and economically significant. Our results suggest that regulators should look for corporate opportunistic behavior where it is not expected.

Founding Family Ownership and Firm Performance in Consumer Goods Industry: Evidence from Indonesia

Founding Family Ownership and Firm Performance in Consumer Goods Industry: Evidence from Indonesia

Margaretha Bambang Bina Nusantara University (Binus) – Binus Business School

Marko Hermawan Victoria University of Wellington

July 11, 2013

This research investigates the significant influence of family ownership on the firm performance in order to provide information to decision maker and other interested parties. The analysis includes comparison between family and non-family firm performance in Indonesia. The samples are taken from 31 consumer goods companies, listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange, ranging from 2005 to 2009. The result describes that non-family firms perform better than family firms and no significant influence between family ownership and firm’s profitability. On the other hand, family ownership has negative contribution to firm market valuation. The study suggests that family firms have less financial performance than that of non-family. Family member within the top position and have major control rights contribute negative influence to firm performance. The evidence raises concerns about possible profit manipulation and weak governance law in Indonesia, and as a result there is an expropriation of wealth to the majority and family related shareholders.

The Role of Institutional Investors in Public-to-Private Transactions

The Role of Institutional Investors in Public-to-Private Transactions

Emanuele Bajo University of Bologna – Department of Management

Massimiliano Barbi University of Bologna – Department of Management

Marco Bigelli University of Bologna – Department of Management

David Hillier University of Strathclyde, Glasgow – Department of Accounting and Finance

July 5, 2013
Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming

In Italy, as in many other European countries, listed firms will normally go dark through controlling owner-initiated tender offers. We find that institutional investors play a central role in the bid process and can protect minority shareholders from being frozen out in the bid. Specifically, tender offers are less likely to succeed when a firm has institutional investors in its ownership structure. When public-to-private offers are accepted, bid premiums are significantly greater if a financial institution (particularly when it is foreign, independent or activist) has a stake in the firm. We explore the effect of a number of hitherto unexplored factors on the takeover premium and find that shareholder agreements facilitate public-to-private acquisitions. Other factors, such as a threat to merge the target if the bid fails, or external validation of the offer price, have no impact on either the likelihood of delisting or the premium paid by the bidder.

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