Informed Trading Before Unscheduled Corporate Events: Theory and Evidence
July 24, 2013 Leave a comment
Informed Trading Before Unscheduled Corporate Events: Theory and Evidence
Shmuel Baruch University of Utah – Department of Finance
Marios A. Panayides University of Pittsburgh – Finance Group; University of Utah
Kumar Venkataraman Southern Methodist University (SMU) – Edwin L. Cox School of Business
May 2013
Abstract:
Despite widespread evidence that informed agents are active before corporate events, there is little work describing how informed agents accumulate positions and what explains their trading strategies. We use the prisoners’ dilemma to model the execution risk that informed traders impose on each other and explain why they forgo the price benefit of limit orders and use instead market orders. However the efficient limit-orders outcome is obtained if there is sufficient uncertainty about the presence of informed traders. We link the level of uncertainty to costly short selling and test theoretical predictions using order level data from Euronext Paris. We find empirical support for the prediction that informed traders use limit orders when the news is negative, especially when (a) the investor base is not broad, (b) security borrowing costs are high, and (c) the magnitude of the event is small so potential profits cannot justify the cost of borrowing. When the news is positive, we show that informed buyers face more competition and use market orders. These results help explain the buy-sell asymmetry in price impact of trades and provide a framework for surveillance systems that are designed to detect insider trading.