Do Security Analysts Speak in Two Tongues?
June 5, 2014 Leave a comment
Do Security Analysts Speak in Two Tongues?
Ulrike Malmendier
University of California, Berkeley
Devin Shanthikumar
University of California, Irvine
Why do security analysts issue overly positive recommendations? We propose a novel
approach to distinguish strategic motives (e.g., generating small-investor purchases and
pleasing management) from nonstrategic motives (genuine overoptimism). We argue that
nonstrategic distorters tend to issue both positive recommendations and optimistic forecasts,
while strategic distorters “speak in two tongues,” issuing overly positive recommendations
but less optimistic forecasts. We show that the incidence of strategic distortion is large and
systematically related to proxies for incentive misalignment. Our “two-tongues metric”
reveals strategic distortion beyond those indicators and provides a new tool for detecting
incentives to distort that are hard to identify otherwise.
