Valuation-driven profit transfer among corporate segments
June 5, 2014 Leave a comment
Rev Account Stud (2014) 19:805–838
Valuation-driven profit transfer among corporate segments
Haifeng You
Published online: 4 February 2014
Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract This paper investigates whether the desire to achieve higher equity
valuations induces conglomerates to manipulate their segment earnings. I extend the
Stein (Q J Econ 104:655–669, 1989) model to a multi-segment setting and show that
conglomerates have incentives to transfer profits from segments operating in
industries with lower valuation multiples to those with higher multiples, even if the
market is not fooled in equilibrium. If companies engage in such manipulation,
segments with relatively high (low) valuations should report abnormally high (low)
profits. The empirical tests confirm this prediction and further show that the relation
is stronger for firms with more dispersed segment valuations. This paper also
demonstrates that the simple sum-of-the-parts valuation with multiples tends to
overestimate the enterprise values for conglomerates and that the measurement
errors increase with segment valuation dispersion.
