The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting
June 6, 2014 Leave a comment
Accounting, Organizations and Society 39 (2014) 237–246
The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting q
Jason L. Browna,⇑, Joseph G. Fisher a, Matthew Sooy b, Geoffrey B. Sprinklea
abstract
We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in
practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound
decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four
ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation,
and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect
participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where
participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit
significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly
decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest
than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find
significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings
conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on
the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also
find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings
neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study
and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.
