CEO Turnover, Earnings Management, & Family Control
June 3, 2013 Leave a comment
CEO Turnover, Earnings Management, & Family Control
John Manuel Barrios Jr.University of Miami
Daniele Macciocchi LUISS Guido Carli University
May 22, 2013
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to study the relation between earnings management and CEO turnover in the context of family firms. Specifically, we investigate whether the probability of the CEO being dismissed increase with the level of earnings management and if this relation is the same in family controlled firms. Using a sample of 221 Italian family and non-family firms between 2006-2010, we find that there is a positive association between earnings management and CEO turnover with non-family firms driving the results. Additionally, we find that in family firms the likelihood of CEO turnover is even lower when a member of the controlling family acts as CEO. Results suggest that family and non-family firms engage in the same level of earnings management, thus supporting the existence of two different corporate governance systems. This study provides empirical support for the understandings of corporate governance mechanisms in retaining and punishing managers’ opportunistic behaviors, and it provides evidence about the different corporate governance systems between family and non-family controlled companies. The issue is relevant because it has never been tackled from an empirical perspective in the family firms’ context, which presents some important peculiarities when compared to other more widely studied corporate governance systems. These results offer insight for policy makers and investors operating in the context of family controlled companies as they point to the diverse effects of corporate governance policies.
