Do Private Equity Funds Game Returns? We find evidence of managers boosting reported NAVs during times that fundraising activity is likely to occur
June 3, 2013 Leave a comment
Do Private Equity Funds Game Returns?
Gregory W. Brown University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill – Finance Area
Oleg Gredil University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill – Kenan-Flagler Business School
Steven N. Kaplan University of Chicago – Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
May 29, 2013
Abstract:
By their nature, private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. This uncertainty in asset valuation gives rise to the potential for fund managers to manipulate reported net asset values (NAVs). Managers may have an incentive to game valuations in the short-run if returns on existing funds are used by investors to make decisions about commitments to subsequent funds managed by the same firm. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of reported NAV manipulation. We find evidence of managers boosting reported NAVs during times that fundraising activity is likely to occur. However, this behavior is mostly limited to firms that are subsequently unsuccessful at raising a next fund which suggests that investors see through the manipulation. In contrast, we find evidence that top-performing funds under-report returns. This conservatism is consistent with these firms insuring against future bad luck that could make them appear as though they are NAV manipulators. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and alternative explanations.
