Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia
June 4, 2013 Leave a comment
Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia
Alex Edmans London Business School – Institute of Finance and Accounting; University of Pennsylvania – The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Vivian W. Fang University of Minnesota – Twin Cities – Department of Accounting
Katharina Lewellen Dartmouth College – Tuck School of Business
May 25, 2013
Abstract:
This paper links the imminent vesting of a CEO’s equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager’s short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives but their horizon: equity will not induce myopia if it has a long vesting period. We use recent changes in compensation disclosure to introduce a new empirical measure that is tightly linked to theory – the stock-price sensitivity of shares and options vesting over the upcoming year. This sensitivity is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely to be driven by current investment opportunities. A one standard deviation increase in the sensitivity of imminently vesting equity is associated with a decline of 0.23% in the growth of R&D (scaled by total assets), 75% of the average R&D growth rate of 0.3%. Similar results hold when including advertising and capital expenditure. In addition, CEOs with imminently-vesting equity are significantly more likely to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts by a narrow margin.
