The Use of Escrow Contracts in Acquisition Agreements
June 7, 2013 Leave a comment
The Use of Escrow Contracts in Acquisition Agreements
Sanjai Bhagat University of Colorado at Boulder – Department of Finance
Sandy Klasa University of Arizona – Department of Finance
Lubomir P. Litov University of Arizona – Department of Finance; University of Pennsylvania – Wharton Financial Institutions Center
May 28, 2013
Abstract:
Many private firm and subsidiary acquisition deals make use of escrow contracts, whereby a fraction of the total sale proceeds are placed in an escrow account. These contracts give the bidder the opportunity to lay claim on these funds subsequent to the acquisition if the seller fails to meet specific terms of the acquisition agreement or it is found that negative information about the target was hidden from the bidder. We hypothesize that escrow contracts are an efficient contracting mechanism that helps bidders and targets to manage acquisition-related transaction risk and mitigate information asymmetry problems. Supporting our hypothesis, we show using hand-collected data that the likelihood an escrow contract is used in a private firm or subsidiary acquisition is higher when bidder transaction risk or information asymmetry about the value of the target is larger. Further, we document that escrow contracts enable the seller to obtain a higher sale price and that the use of these contracts positively impacts the extent to which a private firm or subsidiary acquisition results in value creation for the bidder.
