Expectation Gap and Corporate Fraud: Is Public Opinion Reconcilable with Auditors’ Duties? Expectation gap is unlikely to disappear given that auditor is unable or unwilling to assess the subjective components of fraudulent behavior
June 12, 2013 Leave a comment
Expectation Gap and Corporate Fraud: Is Public Opinion Reconcilable with Auditors’ Duties?
Jeffrey R. Cohen Boston College – Department of Accounting
Yuan Ding China Europe International Business School (CEIBS)
Cédric Lesage HEC School of Management, Paris
Hervé Stolowy HEC Paris – Accounting and Management Control Department
January 15, 2013
CAAA Annual Conference 2013
Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to answer the key question of whether auditors’ view of their fraud detection duties is reconcilable with the public’s view. We perform a content analysis of press articles covering 37 U.S. corporate fraud cases discovered during the period 1992-2005. We compare the auditors’ duties (as described by the auditing standards) with the public opinion represented by these press articles. Consistent with Porter (1993), we identify three types of divergence between public expectations and auditing standards: deficient performance (that we label “Type 1”), deficient standards (“Type 2”) and unreasonable expectations (“Type 3”). The Type 1 gap can be reduced by strengthening auditors’ willingness and ability to apply existing auditing standards on fraud detection. The Type 2 gap can be narrowed by improving the existing auditing standards. The Type 3 gap, however, concerns highly subjective criteria beyond the auditors’ usual sphere of control. The results of our analysis confirm that the expectation gap is unlikely to disappear given that the rational auditor is unable or unwilling to assess the subjective components of fraudulent behavior, and that value judgments, as demonstrated in the media, retain their popularity.
